Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods

Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526 (2017)
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Abstract

It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs.

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Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

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