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Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Anthony Hatzimoysis
University of Athens
  1.  48
    Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
    Phenomenology has done more than any other school of thought for bringing emotions to the forefront of philosophical inquiry. The main reason for the interest shown by phenomenologists in the nature of emotions is perhaps not easily discernible. It might be thought that phenomenologists focus on emotions because the felt the quality of most emotional states renders them a privileged object of inquiry into the phenomenal properties of human experience. That view, in its turn, might lead one to think that (...)
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  2.  98
    The Case Against Unconscious Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):292–299.
    Talk of the unconscious in the philosophy of emotions concerns twothings. It can refer to an emotion whose existence is not in any way presentto consciousness. Or, it can refer to emotional phenomena whose meaning lies in the unconscious. My interest here is in the former issue of whether emotional states can exceed the reach of conscious awareness. I start with a presentation of psychoanalytic views that inform contemporary work toward a cognitivist analysis of emotion. The discussion of cognitivism leads (...)
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  3.  60
    In Search for the Rationality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 281-296.
    What it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality? It is commonly assumed that the cognitive rationality of an affective state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the state is about, its so called intentional object; but, given that moods do not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see how they can be in the offing (...)
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  4.  50
    Passive Fear.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):613-623.
    “Passive fear” denotes a certain type of response to a perceived threat; what is distinctive about the state of passive fear is that its behavioral outlook appears to qualify the emotional experience. I distinguish between two cases of passive fear: one is that of freezing in fear; the other is that of fear-involved tonic immobility. I reconstruct the explanatory strategy that is commonly employed in the field of emotion science, and argue that it leaves certain questions about the nature of (...)
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  5.  52
    VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism: Anthony Hatzimoysis.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.
    Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.
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  6.  57
    Ontology and Axiology.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (280):293 - 296.
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  7.  8
    A Sartrean Critique of Introspection.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
    Sartre draws a sharp distinction between consciousness, on the one hand, and inner sense or knowledge of (it)self, on the other: ‘La conscience n’est pas un mode de connaisance particullier, appelé sens intime ou connaisance de soi’ (B& N: 7). I explore in detail the meaning of the terms involved in that distinction with a view to highlight its significance.
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  8.  15
    Morality and the Natural Grounds of Sociability: Patricia S. Churchland: Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, 288pp, $24.95/£16.95 HB.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):455-457.
    Morality and the natural grounds of sociability Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9612-7 Authors Anthony Hatzimoysis, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, University Campus, 157 71 Athens, Greece Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  9.  55
    Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.
    It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs.
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  10.  26
    The Philosopher and His Novel.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Philosophical Inquiry 25 (1-2):171-177.
    Nausea by Jean-Paul Sartre is often interpreted as an ideal textbook summarising the main points of Sartre’s quite technical argumentation in his academic writings; it illustrates his theoretical views on the nature of time, while it presents a philosophical justification of art through the adventures of the novel’s hero, who is none other than the author in disguise. I show that, despite its popularity, this interpretation is incorrect. I provide an alternative reading of the novel that would identify its core (...)
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