Apriority and Essential Truth

Metaphysica 20 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
There is a line of thought, neglected in recent philosophy, according to which a priori knowable truths such as those of logic and mathematics have their special epistemic status in virtue of a certain tight connection between their meaning and their truth. Historical associations notwithstanding, this view does not mandate any kind of problematic deflationism about meaning, modality or essence. On the contrary, we should be upfront about it being a highly debatable metaphysical idea, while nonetheless insisting that it be given due consideration. From this standpoint, I suggest that the Finean distinction between essence and modality allows us to refine the view. While liberal about meaning, modality and essence, the view is not without bite: it is reasonable to suppose that it is able to ward off philosophical confusions stemming from the undue assimilation of a priori to empirical knowledge.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-11-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
What is Meaning.Soames, Scott

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
71 ( #34,511 of 45,649 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
71 ( #9,711 of 45,649 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.