Spinoza's parallelism doctrine and metaphysical sympathy

In Eric Schliesser Christa Mercer (ed.), Sympathy: Oxford Philosophical Concepts (2015)
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This paper offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. It argues Spinoza reinterprets the ancient doctrine of metaphysical sympathy among ostensibly disconnected and distant beings in terms of fully intelligible relations of 1) identity between formal and objective reality, and in terms of 2) "real identity," grounded in Spinoza's substance-monism. Finally, the paper argues against the standard reading of mind-body pairs as "numerically identical".
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First archival date: 2014-08-08
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