That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic)

The Monist 81 (1):277-99 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such statements might actually fail to have a determinate truth-value. That makes Indefinitism a cousin of mathematical Intuitionism.

Author's Profile

Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-03-08

Downloads
1,855 (#6,327)

6 months
154 (#24,323)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?