Recent Issues in High-Level Perception

Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862 (2016)
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Abstract
Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high-level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach.
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First archival date: 2016-09-03
Latest version: 2 (2018-06-21)
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking is Believing.Mandelbaum, Eric
Philosophical investigations.Wittgenstein, Ludwig & Anscombe, G. E. M.

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2016-09-03

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