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  1. added 2020-04-28
    Farewell to Chalmers' Zombie - The 'Principle Self-Preservation' as the Basis of 'Sense'.Dieter Wandschneider - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72:246-262.
    My argument is that Chalmers' zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal internal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily implies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere physical' being is transcended if, in the form of phenomenal (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-23
    The Strange Nature of Quantum Perception: To See a Photon, One Must Be a Photon.Steven M. Rosen - unknown
    This paper takes as its point of departure recent research into the possibility that human beings can perceive single photons. In order to appreciate what quantum perception may entail, we first explore several of the leading interpretations of quantum mechanics, then consider an alternative view based on the ontological phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Next, the philosophical analysis is brought into sharper focus by employing a perceptual model, the Necker cube, augmented by the topology of the Klein bottle. (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-09
    Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    What turns the continuous flow of experience into perceptually distinct objects? Can our verbal descriptions unambiguously capture what it is like to see, hear, or feel? How might we reason about the testimony that perception alone discloses? Christian Coseru proposes a rigorous and highly original way to answer these questions by developing a framework for understanding perception as a mode of apprehension that is intentionally constituted, pragmatically oriented, and causally effective. By engaging with recent discussions in phenomenology and analytic philosophy (...)
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  4. added 2019-10-17
    Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterizes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...)
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  5. added 2019-10-02
    Learning to See.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The reports of individuals who have had their vision restored after a long period of blindness suggest that, immediately after regaining their vision, such individuals are not able to recognize shapes by vision alone. It is often assumed that the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the relationship between visual and tactile representations of shape. However, I maintain that, immediately after having their sight restored, at least some newly sighted individuals undergo visual experiences that instantiate basic (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-29
    A Self-Critical Phenomenology of Criticism. [REVIEW]Joshua M. Hall - 2014 - Dance Chronicle 37:122-128.
    Noel Carroll, a central figure in analytic (Anglo-American) philosophy of art, and spouse of renowned dance scholar Sally Banes (who co-authored several of these essays), offers us something remarkable in his new book—namely, a collection of thirty years of his theoretical essays and dance reviews. Carroll wrote some of the pieces while he was a graduate student at the University of Illinois, Chicago, and there have been some dramatic changes since then in both the art world and Carroll’s philosophical views. (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-15
    Precis of Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):9-24.
    The point of departure for Perceiving Reality is the idea that per- ception is an embodied structural feature of consciousness whose function is determined by phenomenal experiences in a corresponding domain (of visible, tangibles, etc.). In Perceiving Reality, I try to develop a way of conceiving of our most basic mode of being in the world that resists attempts to cleave reality into an inner and outer, a mental and a physical domain. The central argument of the book is that (...)
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  8. added 2019-08-23
    Feeling at One: Socio-Affective Distribution, Vibe, and Dance-Music Consciousness.Maria A. G. Witek - 2019 - In Ruth Herbert, Eric Clarke & David Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness 2: Worlds, Practices, Modalities. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93–112.
    In this chapter, the embodied consciousness of clubbing and raving is considered through the theory of extended mind, according to which the mind is a distributed system where brain, body, and environment play equal parts. Building on the idea of music as affective atmosphere, a case is made for considering the vibe of a dance party as cognitively, socially, and affectively distributed. The chapter suggests that participating in the vibe affords primary musical consciousness—a kind of pre-reflexive state characterized by affective (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-13
    The Modus Vivendi of Persons with Schizophrenia: Valueception Impairment and Phenomenological Reduction.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - Thaumàzein – Rivista di Filosofia 6:78-92.
    So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of focus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of valueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-11
    Objects, Seeing, and Object-Seeing.Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Two questions are addressed in this paper. First, what is it to see? I argue that it is veridical experience of things outside the perceiver brought about by looking. Second, what is it to see a material object? I argue that it is experience of an occupant of a spatial region that is a logical subject for other visual features, able to move to another spatial region, to change intrinsically, and to interact with other material objects. I show how this (...)
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  11. added 2019-03-22
    Biosemiotic and psychopathology of the ordo amoris. Biosemiotica e psicopatologia dell'ordo amoris. In dialogo con Max Scheler.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - Milano MI, Italia: FrancoAngeli.
    How comes that two organisms can interact with each other or that we can comprehend what the other experiences? The theories of embodiment, intersubjectivity or empathy have repeatedly taken as their starting point an individualistic assumption (the comprehension of the other comes after the self-comprehension) or a cognitivist one (the affective dimension follows the cognitive process). The thesis of this book is that there are no two isolated entities at the origin which successively interact with each other. There is, rather, (...)
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  12. added 2019-02-22
    Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
    Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...)
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  13. added 2018-12-17
    La vérité et le champ visuel.Barry Smith - 2002 - In Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Francisco J. Varela & Bernard Pachoud (eds.), Naturaliser la phénoménologie: Husserlianisme et science cognitive. Paris: CNRS Editions. pp. 411-426.
    La présente étude utilise les outils du domaine de la méréotopologie (la théorie des parts, ensembles et frontières) pour élaborer les implications de certaines analogies entre la 'psychologie écologique' de J.J.Gibson et la phénoménologie de Edmund Husserl. On présentera une théorie ontologique de frontières spatiales et des entités possédant une extension spatiale. S'en rapportant aux exemples de la sphère de géographie, on démontre qu'aussi bien les frontières que les entités à extension spatiale appartiennent à deux vastes catégories: des objets qui (...)
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  14. added 2018-12-05
    La nostalgia restauradora, el ocaso de la hermenéutica del punto de vista ajeno.Jorge Montesó Ventura - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 75:177-190.
    Nostalgia is the emotional effect that causes searching between memories the disappeared home, longed for. In itself, while researching in memories, it implies a certain degree of self-absorption and individuation, because the memories are in extremely particular, a return to the self. When this nostalgia is filled with a restorative eagerness, when it has social and political pretensions, this return translates into a marked distancing between one’s point of view and that of any other, until it becomes a threat to (...)
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  15. added 2018-12-04
    Bodily Awareness and Novel Multisensory Features.Robert Eamon Briscoe - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    According to the decomposition thesis, a subject’s total perceptual experience at a time is an aggregate of discrete, modality‐specific experiences. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences that represent features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness – understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis – and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the (...)
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  16. added 2018-11-05
    Heidegger Uncovered.Jonathan Lewis - 2012 - PhaenEx 7 (2):314-26.
    This paper analyses Mark A. Wrathall’s interpretation of Heidegger’s idea of alêtheia (Unverborgenheit) and its relation to the opening up of the world, the disclosure of being, and the uncovering of entities. It also assesses whether Wrathall’s interpretation of Heidegger is able to do the work necessary to justify the former’s criticisms of contemporary conceptions of the nature of truth, language, and history.
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  17. added 2018-10-18
    Perceptual Presence: An Attentional Account.Mattia Riccardi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2907-2926.
    It is a distinctive mark of normal conscious perception that perceived objects are experienced as actually present in one’s surroundings. The aim of this paper is to offer a phenomenologically accurate and empirically plausible account of the cognitive underpinning of this feature of conscious perception, which I shall call perceptual presence. The paper begins with a preliminary characterization of. I then consider and criticize the seminal account of proposed by Mohan Matthen. In the remainder of the paper I put forward (...)
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  18. added 2018-08-20
    Machines for Living: Philosophy of Technology and the Photographic Image.Ryan Wittingslow - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This dissertation examines the relationship that exists between two distinct and seemingly incompatible bodies of scholarship within the field of contemporary philosophy of technology. The first, as argued by postmodern pragmatist Barry Allen, posits that our tools and what we make with them are epistemically important; disputing the idea that knowledge is strictly sentential or propositional, he claims instead that knowledge is the product of a performance that is both superlative and artefactual, rendering technology importantly world-constituting. The second, as argued (...)
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  19. added 2018-06-26
    The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity.Jan Halák - 2018 - In Bernard Andrieu, Jim Parry, Alessandro Porrovecchio & Olivier Sirost (eds.), Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure. Londýn, Velká Británie: Routledge. pp. 37-50.
    In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic (...)
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  20. added 2018-06-21
    Merleau-Ponty, World-Creating Blindness, and the Phenomenology of Non-Normate Bodies.Joel Michael Reynolds - 2017 - Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty's Thought 19:419-434.
    An increasing number of scholars at the intersection of feminist philosophy and critical disability studies have turned to Merleau-Ponty to develop phenomenologies of disability or of what, following Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, I call "non-normate" embodiment. These studies buck the historical trend of philosophers employing disability as an example of deficiency or harm, a mere litmus test for normative theories, or an umbrella term for aphenotypical bodily variation. While a Merleau-Pontian-inspired phenomenology is a promising starting point for thinking about embodied experiences of (...)
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  21. added 2018-06-15
    Bálint’s Syndrome, Object Seeing, and Spatial Perception.Craig French - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):221-241.
    Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for some suppose that in Bálint's syndrome subjects can see objects without seeing space or spatial location. In this article, I question whether the empirical evidence available to us adequately supports this understanding of Bálint's syndrome, and explain how the aforementioned empirical challenge (...)
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  22. added 2018-05-31
    Realism in Context: The Examples of Lifeworld and Quantum Physics.Gregor Schiemann - 2009 - Human Affairs 19 (2):211-222.
    Lifeworld realism and quantum-physical realism are taken as experience-dependent conceptions of the world that become objects of explicit reflection when confronted with context-external discourses. After a brief sketch of the two contexts of experience—lifeworld and quantum physics—and their realist interpretations, I will discuss the quantum world from the perspective of lifeworld realism. From this perspective, the quantum world—roughly speaking—has to be either unreal or else constitute a different reality. Then, I invert the perspective and examine the lifeworld from the standpoint (...)
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  23. added 2017-12-02
    Merleau-Ponty on Style as the Key to Perceptual Presence and Constancy.Samantha Matherne - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4):693-727.
    In recent discussions of two important issues in the philosophy of perception, viz. the problems of perceptual presence and perceptual constancy, Merleau-Ponty’s ideas have been garnering attention thanks to the work of Sean Kelly and Alva Noë. Although both Kelly’s normative approach and Noë’s enactive approach highlight important aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s view, I argue that neither does full justice to it because they overlook the central role that style plays in his solution to these problems. I show that a closer (...)
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  24. added 2017-09-09
    Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):135-150.
    Back when researchers thought about the various forms that color vision could take, the focus was primarily on the retinal mechanisms. Since that time, research on human color vision has shifted from an interest in retinal mechanisms to cortical color processing. This has allowed color research to provide insight into questions that are not limited to early vision but extend to cognition. Direct cortical connections from higher-level areas to lower-level areas have been found throughout the brain. One of the classic (...)
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  25. added 2017-09-04
    Alterity, Otherness and Journalism: From Phenomenology to Narration of Modes of Existence.Camila Freitas & Marcia Benetti - 2017 - Brazilian Journalism Research 13 (02):10-29.
    In a theoretical reflection, the aim of this paper is primarily to discuss alterity in journalism. We believe that journalism plays a fundamental role in the construction of knowledge on similarities and differences between human beings, stressing social diversity as one of its purposes. We associate the concept of otherness, understood as a singular mode of existence of the “other”, with the purpose of journalism and with actions of empathy, sympathy and compassion. Based on a phenomenological perspective, we discuss the (...)
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  26. added 2017-09-01
    Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.
    Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume. Careful consideration of mundane examples, (...)
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  27. added 2017-08-12
    Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.
    I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...)
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  28. added 2017-08-10
    Thinking with Sensations.Boyd Millar - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):134-154.
    If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by (...)
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  29. added 2017-06-15
    Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing-in Account.Robert Schroer - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):209-230.
    In seeing a tilted penny, we are experientially aware of both its circularity and another shape, which I dub ‘β-ellipticality’. Some claim that our experiential awareness of the intrinsic shapes/sizes of everyday objects depends upon our experiential awareness of β-shapes/β-sizes. In contrast, I maintain that β-property experiences are the result of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing-in’, but run in reverse: instead of seeing a three-dimensional object in a flat surface, we see a flat surface in a three-dimensional object. Using this (...)
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  30. added 2017-03-12
    Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. Section (...)
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  31. added 2016-12-08
    The Elusive Appearance of Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--304.
    It is widely assumed that time appears to be tensed, i.e. divided into a future, present and past, and transitory, i.e. involving some kind of ‘flow’ or ‘passage’ of times or events from the future into the present and away into the distant past. In this paper I provide some reasons to doubt that time appears to be tensed and transitory, or at least that philosophers who have suggested that time appears to be that way have included in ‘appearance’ everything (...)
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  32. added 2016-11-14
    Some Considerations on Pitch.E. Di Bona - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4:244-54.
    Pitch is an audible quality of sound which can be explained not only in terms of strong correlation with sound waves’ properties, but also by a neat correlation to the properties of the sounding object. This seems to be in favour of the theory of sound labelled “distal view”, according to which sound is the vibration of the sounding object.
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  33. added 2016-09-03
    Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
    Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...)
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  34. added 2016-06-15
    The Unity of Hallucinations.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
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  35. added 2016-02-28
    Phenomenology and the Visibility of the Mental.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan 29:13-25.
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  36. added 2015-09-21
    Naturerkenntnis Und Natursein (Für Gernot Böhme).Gregor Schiemann, Michael Hauskeller & Christoph Rehmann-Sutter (eds.) - 1998 - Suhrkamp.
    Indem dieser Band sich auf das Verhältnis von Naturerkennen und Natursein konzentriert, thematisiert er einen wesentlichen Ausschnitt aus dem weiten Spektrum von Böhmes philosophischer Arbeit. Um die Naturthematik möglichst breit zu entfalten und für Querverbindungen offenzuhalten, ist der vorliegende Band in drei Abschnitte gegliedert. Im ersten Abschnitt stehen Charakter und Reichweite der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis von Natur im Mittelpunkt. Der zweite Teil des Bandes stellt alternative Perspektiven auf Natur vor. Im dritten Teil schließlich stehen der Mensch und sein Verhältnis zu sich (...)
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  37. added 2015-08-11
    A Layered View of Shape Perception.E. J. Green - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
    This article develops a view of shape representation both in visual experience and in subpersonal visual processing. The view is that, in both cases, shape is represented in a ‘layered’ manner: an object is represented as having multiple shape properties, and these properties have varying degrees of abstraction. I argue that this view is supported both by the facts about visual phenomenology and by a large collection of evidence in perceptual psychology. Such evidence is provided by studies of shape discriminability, (...)
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  38. added 2014-12-19
    Merleau-Ponty: A Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind and Body.Sara Heinämaa - 2013 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 59-83.
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  39. added 2014-12-19
    Merleau-Ponty’s Dialogue with Descartes: The Living Body and its Position in Metaphysics.Sara Heinämaa - 2003 - In Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinämaa & Hans Ruin (eds.), Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23-48.
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  40. added 2014-08-31
    What We Hear.Jason Leddington - 2014 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    A longstanding philosophical tradition holds that the primary objects of hearing are sounds rather than sound sources. In this case, we hear sound sources by—or in virtue of—hearing their sounds. This paper argues that, on the contrary, we have good reason to believe that the primary objects of hearing are sound sources, and that the relationship between a sound and its source is much like the relationship between a color and its bearer. Just as we see objects in seeing their (...)
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  41. added 2014-07-06
    Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view”, “perspectival” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Philosophers have assessed this view on the basis of phenomenological, epistemological or other purely philosophical considerations. My aim in this paper is to examine whether it is possible to evaluate RPV empirically. In the first, negative part of the paper I consider and reject a certain tempting way of doing so. In (...)
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  42. added 2014-05-09
    Gestalt Models for Data Decomposition and Functional Architecture in Visual Neuroscience.Carmelo Calì - 2013 - Gestalt Theory 35 (3).
    Attempts to introduce Gestalt theory into the realm of visual neuroscience are discussed on both theoretical and experimental grounds. To define the framework in which these proposals can be defended, this paper outlines the characteristics of a standard model, which qualifies as a received view in the visual neurosciences, and of the research into natural images statistics. The objections to the standard model and the main questions of the natural images research are presented. On these grounds, this paper defends the (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-04
    Do We See Apples as Edible?Bence Nanay - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322.
    Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-04
    Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
    I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-04
    What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-03
    Heidegger: On Becoming Self Liberated Through the Manifestation of Appearance.Rudolph Bauer - 2013 - Transmission 6.
    This paper focuses on Heidegger's presentation of becoming self liberated.
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  47. added 2013-10-29
    Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2012 - Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
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  48. added 2013-10-23
    On Experiencing High-Level Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):177-187.
    Tim Bayne and Susanna Siegel have recently offered interesting arguments in favor of the view that we can experience high-level properties like being a pine tree or being a stethoscope (Bayne 2009, Siegel 2006, 2011). We argue first that Bayne’s simpler argument fails. However, our main aim in this paper is to show that Siegel’s more sophisticated argument for her version of the high-level view can also be resisted if one adopts a view that distinguishes between perceptual experiences and seemings.
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  49. added 2013-09-29
    The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
    A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology (...)
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  50. added 2013-09-29
    The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
    When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that to perceive is to (...)
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