The Nature of Skeptical Theism: Answering Nonstandard Objections to Skeptical Theism
Philosophia Christi 21 (1):103-117 (2019)
Abstract
Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Recently, Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs have argued that the theses that ground skeptical theism are either false or limited in scope. In this article, I show that their objections rest on dubious assumptions about the nature of skeptical theism. Along the way, I develop and clarify the ambiguous parts of skeptical theism. The upshot of this is that—once the nature of skeptical theism is made clearer—it is far more difficult to resist.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HENTNO-9
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-04
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-05-13
Total views
135 ( #45,726 of 71,384 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #42,316 of 71,384 )
2019-05-13
Total views
135 ( #45,726 of 71,384 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #42,316 of 71,384 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.