What’s the Relationship Between the Theory and Practice of Moral Responsibility?

Humana Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (42):29-62 (2022)
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This article identifies a novel challenge to standard understandings of responsibility practices, animated by experimental studies of biases and heuristics. It goes on to argue that this challenge illustrates a general methodological challenge for theorizing about responsibility. That is, it is difficult for a theory to give us both guidance in real world contexts and an account of the metaphysical and normative foundations of responsibility without treating wide swaths of ordinary practice as defective. The general upshot is that theories must either hew more closely to actual practice than they appear to, or they must provide some normative foundation for responsibility that does not go through actual practice.

Author Profiles

Henry Argetsinger
University of California, San Diego
Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego


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