Is there any real substance to the claims for a 'new computationalism'?

In CiE Computability in Europe 2017. Springer Verlag (forthcoming)
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Abstract
'Computationalism' is a relatively vague term used to describe attempts to apply Turing's model of computation to phenomena outside its original purview: in modelling the human mind, in physics, mathematics, etc. Early versions of computationalism faced strong objections from many (and varied) quarters, from philosophers to practitioners of the aforementioned disciplines. Here we will not address the fundamental question of whether computational models are appropriate for describing some or all of the wide range of processes that they have been applied to, but will focus instead on whether `renovated' versions of the \textit{new computationalism} shed any new light on or resolve previous tensions between proponents and skeptics. We find this, however, not to be the case, because the 'new computationalism' falls short by using limited versions of "traditional computation", or proposing computational models that easily fall within the scope of Turing's original model, or else proffering versions of hypercomputation with its many pitfalls.
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