Enactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysis

Adaptive Behavior 23 (1):20-33 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a characterization of normativity as an essentially social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism.

Author Profiles

Manuel De Pinedo García
University of Granada
Manuel Heras Escribano
University of the Basque Country

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