Enactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysis

Adaptive Behavior 23 (1):20-33 (2015)
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In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a characterization of normativity as an essentially social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism.
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How to Do Things with Words.Austin, John Langshaw
Philosophical Investigations.Wittgenstein, Ludwig

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Are Affordances Normative?Heras-Escribano, Manuel & de Pinedo, Manuel

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