Counterfactual theories of knowledge and the notion of actuality

Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673 (2016)
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Abstract

The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. An alternative solution is put forward. The key is to rethink the closeness relation that is at the heart of counterfactual theories of knowledge

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Jan Heylen
KU Leuven

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