Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):636-652 (2017)
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Abstract
Fregean theories of descriptions as terms have to deal with improper descriptions. To save bivalence various proposals have been made that involve assigning referents to improper descriptions. While bivalence is indeed saved, there is a price to be paid. Instantiations of the same general scheme, viz. the one and only individual that is F and G is G, are not only allowed but even required to have different truth values.
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Archival date: 2019-05-28
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On Denoting.Russell, Bertrand
Descriptions.Neale, Stephen
On Referring.Strawson, P. F.

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