Controlling attitudes

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74 (2006)
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Abstract

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

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Pamela Hieronymi
University of California, Los Angeles

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