Inferring by Attaching Force

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714 (2019)
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The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.
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First archival date: 2019-02-27
Latest version: 2 (2020-06-20)
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