Limits of Abductivism About Logic

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340 (2020)
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I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abduction.

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Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University


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