Contents
161 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 161
  1. A defense of causalist continuism.Matheus Diesel Werberich - manuscript
    Traditionally, philosophers consider the question of whether episodic memory and imagination belong to the same kind (the (dis)continuism problem) as ultimately depending on the causality question - i.e., whether remembering requires a causal connection to the past event. In this framework, if memory is a simulation process (as claimed by simulationism) and does not require a causal connection, then it is sufficiently similar to imagination and, thus, continuism follows. On the other hand, if a causal connection is necessary for memory (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Eliminating episodic memory?Nikola Andonovski, John Sutton & Christopher McCarroll - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
    In Tulving’s initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations, and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural, and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research program has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the ‘common system’ view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Experience replay algorithms and the function of episodic memory.Alexandria Boyle - forthcoming - In Lynn Nadel & Sara Aronowitz (eds.), Space, Time, and Memory. Oxford University Press.
    Episodic memory is memory for past events. It’s characteristically associated with an experience of ‘mentally replaying’ one’s experiences in the mind’s eye. This biological phenomenon has inspired the development of several ‘experience replay’ algorithms in AI. In this chapter, I ask whether experience replay algorithms might shed light on a puzzle about episodic memory’s function: what does episodic memory contribute to the cognitive systems in which it is found? I argue that experience replay algorithms can serve as idealized models of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Review of Kourken Michaelian, Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past. [REVIEW]Matthew Frise - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Consider the Source: An Examination of the Effects of Externally and Internally Generated Content on Memory.Stan Klein - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.
    Drawing on ideas from philosophy (in particular, epistemology), I argue that one of memory’s most important functions is to provide its owner with knowledge of the physical world. This knowledge helps satisfy the organism’s need to confer stability on an ever-changing reality so the objects in which it consists can be identified and reidentified. I then draw a distinction between sources of knowledge (i.e., from physical vs. subjective reality) and argue—based on evolutionary principles—that because memory was designed by natural selection (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Remembering, Imagining, and Memory Traces: Toward a Continuist Causal Theory.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In Christopher McCarroll, Kourken Michaelian & Andre Sant'Anna (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory. Routledge.
    The (dis)continuism debate in the philosophy and cognitive science of memory concerns whether remembering is continuous with episodic future thought and episodic counterfactual thought in being a form of constructive imagining. I argue that settling that dispute will hinge on whether the memory traces (or “engrams”) that support remembering impose arational, perception-like constraints that are too strong for remembering to constitute a kind of constructive imagining. In exploring that question, I articulate two conceptions of memory traces—the replay theory and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7. Remembering and Imagining: The Attitudinal Continuity.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In Anja Berninger & Íngrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. London: Routledge.
    Cats and dogs are the same kind of thing in being mammals, even if cats are not a kind of dog. In the same way, remembering and imagining might be the same kind of mental state, even if remembering is not a kind of imagining. This chapter explores whether episodic remembering, on the one hand, and future and counter-factual directed imagistic imagining, on the other, may be the same kind of mental state in being instances of the same cognitive attitude. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy.Kourken Michaelian, Denis Perrin & André Sant'Anna - forthcoming - In Anna Abraham (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  9. The phenomenology of remembering is an epistemic feeling.Denis Perrin, Kourken Michaelian & Andre Sant'Anna - forthcoming - Frontiers in Psychology.
    This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Review of C. McCarroll "Remembering From the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind" (OUP, 2018). [REVIEW]André Sant'Anna - forthcoming - Memory Studies.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Debates Contemporâneos em Filosofia da Memória: Uma Breve Introdução.César Schirmer dos Santos, André Sant'Anna, Kourken Michaelian, James Openshaw & Denis Perrin - forthcoming - Lampião.
    Neste artigo apresentamos, de forma concisa e em português, alguns elementos-chave dos principais debates contemporâneos na filosofia da memória. Nosso principal objetivo é tornar essas discussões mais acessíveis aos leitores de língua portuguesa, fornecendo uma atualização importante para esforços anteriores (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019a). Começamos introduzindo a noção de viagem no tempo mental, a qual estabelece a base empírica para a metodologia empregada em trabalhos recentes, antes de apresentar dois debates centrais. Primeiro, o debate entre causalistas e simulacionistas sobre a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account.James Openshaw & Kourken Michaelian - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-32.
    Recent theories of remembering and of reference (or singular thought) have de-emphasised the role causation was thought to play in mid- to late-twentieth century theorising. According to postcausal theories of remembering, such as simulationism, instances of the psychofunctional kind _remembering_ are not, in principle, dependent on appropriate causal chains running from some event(s) remembered to the occurrence of remembering. Instead they depend only on the reliability, or proper functioning, of the cognitive system responsible for their production. According to broadly reliabilist (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory.André Sant'Anna - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Autonoesis and the Galilean science of memory: Explanation, idealization, and the role of crucial data.Nikola Andonovski - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-42.
    The Galilean explanatory style is characterized by the search for the underlying structure of phenomena, the positing of "deep" explanatory principles, and a view of the relation between theory and data, on which the search for "crucial data" is of primary importance. In this paper, I trace the dynamics of adopting the Galilean style, focusing on the science of episodic memory. I argue that memory systems, such as episodic and semantic memory, were posited as underlying competences producing the observable phenomena (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Que reste-t‑il de nos émotions passées?Héloïse Athéa & Marina Trakas - 2023 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 4 (148):511-530.
    Théodule Ribot est l’un des premiers à penser les rapports entre mémoire et émotions. Au sein de ce qu’il appelle la « mémoire affective », il décèle une mémoire spécifique des émotions. Il s’ensuit un débat sur l’existence, la définition et le contenu de cette mémoire. Après les propositions initiales de Ribot, on observe l’émergence progressive d’un consensus : même s’il est possible de distinguer la mémoire affective de la mémoire intellectuelle, tout souvenir présente à des degrés variables des éléments (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. (In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?James Openshaw - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):290-307.
    I suggest that the theories of remembering one finds in the philosophy of memory literature are best characterised as theories principally operating at three different levels of inquiry. Simulationist views are theories of the psychofunctional process type remembering. Causalist views are theories of referential remembering. Epistemic views are theories of successful remembering. Insofar as there is conflict between these theories, it is a conflict of integration rather than—as widely presented—head‐on disagreement. Viewed in this way, we can see the previous awareness (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory.Andre Sant'Anna, Kourken Michaelian & Nikola Andonovski - 2023 - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Is remembering constructive imagining?André Sant’Anna - 2023 - Synthese 202 (5):1-28.
    The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Tempo Subjetivo na Filosofia da Memória: Autonoese e Viagem no Tempo Mental.Gabriel Zaccaro - 2023 - Kínesis - Revista de Estudos Dos Pós-Graduandos Em Filosofia 15 (38):241-266.
    A filosofia da memória é uma área na qual se convergem conhecimentos próprios da filosofia, assim como de evidências empíricas provenientes da área da psicologia cognitiva e das neurociências. Um dos problemas vigentes dentro da filosofia da memória se concentra na busca de uma definição precisa de nossas memórias episódicas, isto é, nossas memórias de eventos do passado. Uma característica inescapável para qualquer definição precisa da memória episódica concerne sua fenomenologia específica. Apesar de ser um elemento majoritariamente estudado na psicologia, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Are forgotten memories literal experiences of absences? Episodic forgetting and metacognitive feelings.Marta Caravà - 2022 - Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43 (3):e61021.
    Are occurrent states of forgetting literal experiences of absences? I situate this question within the debate on mental time travel (MTT) to understand whether these states can be explained as literal experiences of absent episodic memories. To frame my argument, I combine Barkasi and Rosen’s literal approach to MTT with Farennikova’s literal approach to the perception of absences, showing that both are built on the idea that for an experience to be literal it must afford an unmediated contact with the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Propping up the causal theory.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-27.
    Martin and Deutscher’s causal theory of remembering holds that a memory trace serves as a necessary causal link between any genuine episode of remembering and the event it enables one to recall. In recent years, the causal theory has come under fire from researchers across philosophy and cognitive science, who argue that results from the scientific study of memory are incompatible with the kinds of memory traces that Martin and Deutscher hold essential to remembering. Of special note, these critics observe, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. Selfless Memories.Raphaël Millière & Albert Newen - 2022 - Erkenntnis (3):0-22.
    Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. Remembering objects.James Openshaw - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22:1–20.
    Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve ‘episodically’ recalling experienced events in one’s personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. Organic Memory and the Perils of Perigenesis: The Helmholtz-Hering Debate.Lydia Patton - 2022 - In Charles T. Wolfe, Paolo Pecere & Antonio Clericuzio (eds.), Mechanism, Life and Mind in Modern Natural Philosophy. Springer. pp. 345-362.
    This paper will focus on a famous nineteenth century debate over the physiology of perception between Ewald Hering and Hermann von Helmholtz. This debate is often explained as a contest between empiricism (Helmholtz) and nativism (Hering) about perception. I will argue that this is only part of the picture. Hering was a pioneer of Lamarckian explanations, arguing for an early version of the biogenetic law. Hering explains physical processes, including perception, in terms of ‘organic memory’ that is supported by ‘vital (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory.André Sant'Anna & Michael Barkasi - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3.
    The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Different ways of being emotional about the past.Marina Trakas - 2022 - Journal Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):1-14.
    (written in 2017) According to Dorothea Debus (2007), all emotional aspects related to an act of remembering are present and new emotional responses to the remembered past event. This is a common conception of the nature of the emotional aspect of personal memories, if not explicitly defended then at least implicitly accepted in the literature. In this article, I first criticize Debus’ arguments and demonstrate that she does not give us valid reasons to believe that all the emotional aspects related (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. El viaje mental en el tiempo en la filosofía y la ciencias cognitiva de la memoria.Marina Trakas - 2022 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 20:141-163.
    La metáfora de la memoria como “viaje mental en el tiempo” (“mental time travel” en inglés) ha tenido una gran influencia en la ciencia cognitiva de la memoria así como también en la filosofía de la memoria contemporánea. A pesar de su relevancia, no ha habido ninguna discusión teórica real ni sobre el significado de la metáfora en sí misma ni sobre su adecuación para dar cuenta de los recuerdos de experiencias pasadas. Este artículo trata de llenar este vacío al (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Causation in Memory: Necessity, Reliability and Probability.Nikola Andonovski - 2021 - Acta Scientiarum 43 (3).
    In this paper, I argue that causal theories of memory are typically committed to two independent, non-mutually entailing theses. The first thesis pertains to the necessity of appropriate causation in memory, specifying a condition token memories need to satisfy. The second pertains to the explanation of memory reliability in causal terms and it concerns memory as a type of mental state. Post-causal theories of memory can reject only the first (weak post-causalism) or both (strong post-causalism) theses. Upon this backdrop, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. The more-than-human materializations of violence, remembrance, and times of crisis.Evelien Geerts - 2021 - Posthumanities Hub Blog Series.
    In this short essay, I sketch the contours of critical new materialist and posthumanist interventions in memory studies & critical theory via the more-than-human Memorial 22/3.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?Peter Langland-Hassan - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):231-251.
    This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  31. Teoria causal da memória: uma introdução em filosofia da memória.Glaupy Fontana Ribas - 2021 - Griot : Revista de Filosofia 21 (3):148-163.
    This paper is an introduction on the Causal Theory of Memory, one of the most discussed theories in philosophy of memory in the present days. We begin with Martin & Deutscher’s formulation of the theory, in which the authors present three criteria in order for a given mental state to be considered an instance of memory, amongst them, the famous causal criterion, which stipulates that a memory must be causally connected to the past experience. Subsequently, we discuss if these criteria (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Thomas Reid on the Role of Conception and Belief in Perception and Memory.Lucas Thorpe - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (4):357-374.
    Thomas Reid argues that both perception and memory involve a conception of an object and usually cause a corresponding belief. According to defenders of the constitutive interpretation, such as Rebecca Copenhaver, the belief is constitutive of acts of perception and memory. I instead argue for a causal interpretation: although in normal circumstances perceiving and remembering cause a corresponding belief, the belief is not constitutive of perception or memory. Copenhaver's strongest argument for the constitutive interpretation is that perception essentially represents objects (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The sense of mineness in personal memory: Problems for the endorsement model.Marina Trakas - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:155-172.
    What does it take for a subject to experience a personal memory as being her own? According to Fernández’ (2019) model of endorsement, this particular phenomenal quality of our memories, their “sense of mineness”, can be explained in terms of the experience of the mnemonic content as veridical. In this article, I criticize this model for two reasons: (a) the evidence that is used by Fernández to ground his theoretical proposal is dubious; and more importantly, (b) the endorsement model does (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Kinetic Memories. An embodied form of remembering the personal past.Marina Trakas - 2021 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 42 (2):139-174.
    Despite the popularity that the embodied cognition thesis has gained in recent years, explicit memories of events personally experienced are still conceived as disembodied mental representations. It seems that we can consciously remember our personal past through sensory imagery, through concepts, propositions and language, but not through the body. In this article, I defend the idea that the body constitutes a genuine means of representing past personal experiences. For this purpose, I focus on the analysis of bodily movements associated with (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Dimensiones de análisis de los recuerdos personales como recuerdos afectivos.Marina Trakas - 2021 - Revista de Psicología UNLP 20 (1):256-284.
    La investigación reciente en psicología cognitiva sobre la memoria emocional ha estudiado las distintas formas en que las emociones afectan a la memoria, sin profundizar no obstante en la comprensión de la manera en que los aspectos emocionales, afectivos y mnemónicos se encuentran estrechamente entrelazados en el contenido mismo de un acto de reminiscencia. En este artículo propongo un marco conceptual de análisis que nos permite entender los recuerdos personales como recuerdos esencialmente afectivos, y que se articula en torno a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. No trace beyond their name? Affective memories, a forgotten concept.Marina Trakas - 2021 - L'année Psychologique / Topics in Cognitive Psychology 121 (2):129-173.
    It seems natural to think that emotional experiences associated with a memory of a past event are new and present emotional states triggered by the remembered event. This common conception has nonetheless been challenged at the beginning of the 20th century by intellectuals who considered that emotions can be encoded and retrieved, and that emotional aspects linked to memories of the personal past need not necessary to be new emotional responses caused by the act of recollection. They called this specific (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  37. On the Difference Between Episodic and Autobiographical Memories.Gabriel Zaccaro - 2021 - Aporia 21:65-78.
    Is there a difference between recollecting episodes from the past and recalling autobiographically? Both in the philosophical and psychological literature, it does not seem that there is a consensus on whether autobiographical memories should be considered as a metaphysically equivalent concept to episodic memories or a different category of memory entirely. In this article, I give reasons to believe that autobiographical memories do not relate to the recollection of past episodes since they do not have an associated subjective experience and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Filosofia da Memória: Problemas e Debates Acerca da Memória Episódica.Glaupy Fontana Ribas - 2020 - Kínesis - Revista de Estudos Dos Pós-Graduandos Em Filosofia 12 (31):77-106.
    O presente artigo busca situar o leitor em alguns dos debates atuais acerca da memória episódica no âmbito da filosofia da memória. A memória episódica consiste na capacidade de lembrar daquilo que o sujeito vivenciou ao longo de sua vida. Um dos maiores problemas em filosofia da memória é estabelecer o que é uma memória episódica, e distingui-la de outros estados mentais, como a imaginação. As principais teorias que visam resolver tal problema são a Teoria Causal da Memória e a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory.Richard Heersmink - 2020 - Mind and Language 36:1-15.
    In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  40. Confabulating as Unreliable Imagining: In Defence of the Simulationist Account of Unsuccessful Remembering.Kourken Michaelian - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):133-148.
    This paper responds to Bernecker’s attack on Michaelian’s simulationist account of confabulation, as well as his defence of the causalist account of confabulation :432–447, 2016a) against Michaelian’s attack on it. The paper first argues that the simulationist account survives Bernecker’s attack, which takes the form of arguments from the possibility of unjustified memory and justified confabulation, unscathed. It then concedes that Bernecker’s defence of the causalist account against Michaelian’s attack, which takes the form of arguments from the possibility of veridical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  41. The hybrid contents of memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1263-1290.
    This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  42. Unsuccessful Remembering: A Challenge for the Relational View of Memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1539-1562.
    This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. A memória episódica, o problema da cotemporalidade, e o senso comum.César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2020 - In Giovanni Rolla & Gerson Albuquerque de Araújo Neto (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento. Editora da Universidade Federal do Piauí. pp. 151-180.
    Os realistas diretos sobre a memória episódica alegam que um sujeito que lembra está em contato direto com um evento passado. No entanto, como seria possível estar em contato direto com um evento que deixou de existir? Este é o assim-chamado problema da cotemporalidade. A solução padrão para este problema, a qual foi proposta por Sven Bernecker, consiste em distinguir entre, por um lado, a ocorrência de um evento, e, por outro lado, a existência de um evento, de modo que (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Simulationism and the Function(s) of Episodic Memory.Arieh Schwartz - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):487-505.
    According to simulationism, the function of episodic memory is not to remember the past, but to help construct representations of possible future episodes, by drawing together features from different experiential sources. This article suggests that the relationship between the traditional storehouse view, on which the function of memory is remembering, and the simulationist approach is more complicated than has been typically acknowledged. This is attributed, in part, to incorrect interpretations of what remembering on the storehouse view requires. Further, by appeal (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  45. Observer Memories and the Perspectival Mind. On Remembering from the Outside by Christopher McCarroll. [REVIEW]Marina Trakas - 2020 - Análisis Filosófico 40 (1):123-138.
    Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories. On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. Is the simulation theory of memory about simulation?Nikola Andonovski - 2019 - Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10 (3):37.
    This essay investigates the notion of simulation and the role it plays in Kourken Michaelian's simulation theory of memory. I argue that the notion is importantly ambiguous and that this ambiguity may threaten some of the central commitments of the theory. To illustrate that, I examine two different conceptions of simulation: a narrow one (simulation as replication) and a broad one (simulation as computational modeling), arguing that the preferred narrow conception is incompatible with the claim that remembering involves the simulation (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. Aphantasia, SDAM, and Episodic Memory.Lajos Brons - 2019 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 28:9-32.
    Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Resenha de A critical introduction to the epistemology of memory. [REVIEW]Glaupy Fontana Ribas & Úrsula Lied - 2019 - Cognitio 20 (1):456-460.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. The best memories: Identity, narrative, and objects.Richard Heersmink & Christopher Jade McCarroll - 2019 - In Timothy Shanahan & Paul Smart (eds.), Blade Runner 2049: A Philosophical Exploration. Routledge. pp. 87-107.
    Memory is everywhere in Blade Runner 2049. From the dead tree that serves as a memorial and a site of remembrance (“Who keeps a dead tree?”), to the ‘flashbulb’ memories individuals hold about the moment of the ‘blackout’, when all the electronic stores of data were irretrievably erased (“everyone remembers where they were at the blackout”). Indeed, the data wiped out in the blackout itself involves a loss of memory (“all our memory bearings from the time, they were all damaged (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  50. An Essay on the Ontological Foundations and Psychological Realization of Forgetting.Stan Klein - 2019 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 6 (292-305).
    I argue that appreciation of the phenomenon of forgetting requires serious attention to its origins and place in nature. This, in turn, necessitates metaphysical inquiry as well as empirical backing – a combination likely to be eschewed by psychological orthodoxy. But, if we hope to avoid the conceptual vacuity that characterizes too much of contemporary psychological inquiry (e.g., Klein, 2012, 2014a, 2015a, 2016a), a “big picture” approach to phenomena of interest is essential. Adopting this investigative posture turns the “received view” (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 161