Eine Kantische Begründung individueller Klimapflichten

Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (4):679-692 (2020)
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Abstract
According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere, we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.
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Archival date: 2020-12-09
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