Fifteen years of a Classic: New Humean Studies

Prometeus 23:139-150 (2017)
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Abstract
"I tend to agree with more dialectical positions such as Noxon's who, even being a critic of the approach of the two concepts, writes the following: Hume explained certain mental phenomena, notably belief, as effects of the association. And, going further, I say that belief is a feeling or sensation aroused by two factors: habit and the association of ideas, but it does not arise either from one or from other singly, each one is a part of a process that involves both. Therefore habit is an underlying principle which acts upon reasonable beings during their observation of constant conjunctions, in such a way that imagination can associate ideas only through this principle acting in the mind. However, as I have already stated in another text, such an association realised by the imagination will catch up to its certainty status just with the emergence of a feeling which imputes necessity to what is instead merely contingent" (Sample taken up from the text).
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First archival date: 2017-06-23
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