Knowledge by constraint

Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):1-28 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta-semantic assumptions about the context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sensitive to the mechanisms of constraint.

Author's Profile

Ben Holguín
Johns Hopkins University


Added to PP

360 (#40,479)

6 months
113 (#27,083)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?