Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals

Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


A plausible principle about the felicitous use of indicative conditionals says that there is something strange about asserting an indicative conditional when you know whether its antecedent is true. But in most contexts there is nothing strange at all about asserting indicative conditionals like ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did’. This paper argues that the only compelling explanation of these facts requires the resources of contextualism about knowledge.

Author's Profile

Ben Holguín
Johns Hopkins University


Added to PP

627 (#18,785)

6 months
94 (#23,284)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?