Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals

Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771 (2020)
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Abstract
A plausible principle about the felicitous use of indicative conditionals says that there is something strange about asserting an indicative conditional when you know whether its antecedent is true. But in most contexts there is nothing strange at all about asserting indicative conditionals like ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did’. This paper argues that the only compelling explanation of these facts requires the resources of contextualism about knowledge.
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2021
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HOLKIT-3
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Archival date: 2020-05-14
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2020-05-14

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