Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality

Philosophical Explorations 26 (3) (2022)
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Abstract

To explain why we should be structurally rational – or mentally coherent – is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena – positive illusions – are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists dismiss the relevance of positive illusions because they accept evidentialism that reason for belief must be evidence. I argue that their evidentialist stance would imply that we are caught in unsolvable dilemmas arising from positive illusions.

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Tsung-Hsing Ho (何宗興)
National Chung Cheng University

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