Imagining the Past: on the nature of episodic memory

In Fiona MacPherson Fabian Dorsch (ed.), Memory and Imagination. Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract
What kind of mental state is episodic memory? I defend the claim that it is, in key part, imagining the past, where the imagining in question is experiential imagining. To remember a past episode is to experientially imagine how things were, in a way controlled by one’s past experience of that episode. Call this the Inclusion View. I motive this view by appeal both to patterns of compatibilities and incompatibilities between various states, and to phenomenology. The bulk of the paper defends the account against four objections. Imagining and remembering seem to differ in whether they are active or passive, in the forms of singular content they involve, in their relations to observation and in their relations to belief. I argue that these differences can be accommodated, and some even explained, once we flesh out what else is involved in episodic memory, in addition to imagining the past.
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Archival date: 2014-07-23
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Remembering Events and Remembering Looks.Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):351-372.
Episodic Memory as Representing the Past to Oneself.Robert Hopkins - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):313-331.

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