Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology

Critica 52 (155) (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse’s evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse’s argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that people generally experience morality as objective. We demonstrate how recent experimental findings challenge this widely-shared armchair presumption and conclude that Ruse’s argument fails. We situate this finding in the recent debate about Carnapian explication and argue that it illustrates the necessary role that empirical moral psychology plays in explication preparation. Moral psychology sets boundaries for reasonable desiderata in metaethics and, therefore, it is necessary for metaethics.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HOPWMN
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-10-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-12-09

Total views
38 ( #60,632 of 65,550 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #32,985 of 65,550 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.