Devious Stipulations

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recent attempts to answer ontological questions through conceptual analysis have been controversial. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that if the existence of certain things analytically follows from sentences we already accept, then there is no further ontological commitment involved in affirming the existence of those things. More generally, it is plausible that whenever a sentence analytically entails another, the conjunction of those sentences requires nothing more of the world for its truth than the former sentence alone. In his ‘Analyticity and Ontology’, Louis deRosset tries to produce counterexamples to these principles by means of linguistic stipulations. I aim to show where his arguments go wrong.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HORDS-4
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-09-04
Latest version: 3 (2015-07-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-09-04

Total views
522 ( #5,057 of 40,671 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #11,459 of 40,671 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.