Phenomenal Consciousness from the Prospect of Representational Theory of Mind

Falsafe 41 (1):85-104 (2013)
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Abstract
One of the most important questions in epistemology is the nonphysical realities, like phenomenal consciousness. The main claim of physicalism is real explanations of events and properties are only physical explanations and representationalists are agree too. Thus these realities can explained by the rule of biases of physical and objective events.On the other hand , phenomenalists maintain that conscious experiences and aspect of subjectivity of phenomenal consciousness are not. In this article I attempt formulated the problem of phenomenal consciousness based on the Perspectival Subjectivity and next proposed the solutions of theories of representation of mind then declare objections on the theories of representation of mind. There is a question as can be the theory of representation of mind the frame for causal explanation of the problems of phenomenal consciousness?
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First archival date: 2018-11-04
Latest version: 1 (2018-11-04)
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