The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness

American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):379-388 (2018)
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Abstract
It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p. This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p; and (2) believing p is correct qua belief if and only if p. Only can (2) be said to be a truism about belief, but it cannot ground doxastic norms.
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First archival date: 2017-06-07
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