Epistemic humility, arguments from evil, and moral skepticism
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57 (2010)
Abstract
Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails.
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Archival date: 2013-03-18
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2009-02-11
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64 ( #10,715 of 57,178 )
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