On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson’s Case Against Experiential Foundationalism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555 (2002)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-03-18
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
314 ( #10,452 of 42,169 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #23,777 of 42,169 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.