Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives

Res Philosophica (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There’s a long but relatively neglected tradition of attempting to explain why many researchers working on the nature of phenomenal consciousness think that it’s hard to explain. David Chalmers argues that this “meta-problem of consciousness” merits more attention than it has received. He also argues against several existing explanations of why we find consciousness hard to explain. Like Chalmers, we agree that the meta-problem is worthy of more attention. Contra Chalmers, however, we argue that there’s an existing explanation that is more promising than his objections suggest. We argue that researchers find phenomenal consciousness hard to explain because phenomenal concepts are complex demonstratives that encode the impossibility of explaining consciousness as one of their application conditions.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HOWPCA
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-01-11
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-01-11

Total views
140 ( #40,099 of 65,544 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #11,255 of 65,544 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.