Abstract

[Langauge and Idea: An Introduction to an Imaginary Platonic Philosophy of Language] Although Plato, in his Cratylus, did not dwell clearly on such issues as the origin of language or the identity of that which gives the names (nomothétês), he did reveal his opinions about being and knowledge in the context of language, as many commentators unanimously point out. I will primarily explain my reading of Cratylus and then argue that Plato holds an original opinion about name, naming, and the correctness of names and that he cannot be either a naturalist or a conventionalist. The reason for this is, the proponents of both the naturalistic and the conventional opinions as well as their contemporary commentators confuse name with sound or concept, albeit unlike the ancients, who confused it with the named. By reminding the quadruple classification scheme, known about name since ancient times —a scheme based on the comprehension of being as ontological levels— and then by adding Plato's ideas to it, I will argue that it is possible to achieve an “original language” philosophy, and I will try and demonstrate some of the possible consequences of this imaginary philosophy of language through an anachronistic course. In the addendum chapter, I will summarize the discussions of Muslim linguists about origin of language, and then I will review the possibilities of coherence between the resulting data from this summary and Plato's understanding of both language and soul. As a result of this sub-section, I will argue that the investigation into the original language cannot have any other meaning except that of a historical investigation, because the original language —contrary to the hopes of those seeking it— cannot be anything other than the first of all vernacular.