Abstract

In this article, I will introduce the idea of mental anti-representationalism (MAR) that I defended. According to MAR, psychological sentences are not representational. The article has four sections. I will first clarify MAR (“Three Clarifications about the Thesis of MAR”) and explain it with the help of the view of noncognitivism or expressivism in metaethics (“Metaethical Noncognitivism, Expressivism and MAR”). Like noncognitivism, MAR is a negative thesis. However, the positive thesis of MAR is not that psychological sentences express some non-cognitive or desire-like attitudes, but that they are a type of rationality sentence. I will then compare MAR with other views of mind on the market, such as mental eliminativism and mental fictionalism (“Mental Eliminativism, Fictionalism and MAR”). MAR rejects eliminativism and improves fictionalism. Finally, I will outline my main argument for MAR and address some challenges (“My Master Argument Outline and Some Challenges”). My argument relies on the uncodifiability thesis of rationality and my view can avoid what I will call the Question-Begging Problem.