Related

Contents
7 found
Order:
  1. Why Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism Are Untenable.Markus E. Schlosser - 2020 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 41:277–292.
    It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from functionalism mainly in its commitment (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano.Michael Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heurista para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Revisión de La Nueva Ciencia de la Mente (The New Science of the Mind) por Marc Rowlands (2013).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política, Economía, Historia y Literatura - Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 227-241.
    Antes de comentar en "La nueva ciencia de la mente", primero ofrezco algunos comentarios sobre filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como se ejemplifica en las obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. Ayudará a ver mis reseñas de PNC (Filosofía en un Nuevo Siglo), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) y otros libros por y sobre estos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara del comportamiento de orden superior, no se encuentra en (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Pharmacological Significance of Mechanical Intelligence and Artificial Stupidity.Adrian Mróz - 2019 - Kultura I Historia 36 (2):17-40.
    By drawing on the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler, the phenomena of mechanical (a.k.a. artificial, digital, or electronic) intelligence is explored in terms of its real significance as an ever-repeating threat of the reemergence of stupidity (as cowardice), which can be transformed into knowledge (pharmacological analysis of poisons and remedies) by practices of care, through the outlook of what researchers describe equivocally as “artificial stupidity”, which has been identified as a new direction in the future of computer science and machine problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):249-281.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  6. Looking into meta-emotions.Christoph Jäger & Eva Bänninger-Huber - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):787-811.
    There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  7. Ontology, epistemology, and private ostensive definition.Irwin Goldstein - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations