On Self-Knowledge of Motives

The Monist (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers claim that we have duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can’t. Such scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call ‘the myth of the one true motive’. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space to plausibly interpret the empirical data such that knowledge of one’s motives is difficult, but not impossible.

Author's Profile

Pablo Hubacher Haerle
Cambridge University

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-12-21

Downloads
258 (#63,738)

6 months
258 (#9,240)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?