Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition

American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158 (2006)
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Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.

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Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder


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