Dilemmic Epistemology

Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090 (2019)
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Abstract
This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view. Accepting this view, I argue, may enable us to solve several epistemological puzzles.
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Archival date: 2018-06-02
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2018-06-02

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