Weak Rejection

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):741-760 (2017)
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ABSTRACTLinguistic evidence supports the claim that certain, weak rejections are less specific than assertions. On the basis of this evidence, it has been argued that rejected sentences cannot be premisses and conclusions in inferences. We give examples of inferences with weakly rejected sentences as premisses and conclusions. We then propose a logic of weak rejection which accounts for the relevant phenomena and is motivated by principles of coherence in dialogue. We give a semantics for which this logic is sound and complete, show that it axiomatizes the modal logic KD45 and prove that it still derives classical logic on its asserted fragment. Finally, we defend previous logics of strong rejection as being about the linguistically preferred interpretations of weak rejections.
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References found in this work BETA
A Natural History of Negation.Barwise, Jon & Horn, Laurence R.
The Logic of Paradox.Priest, Graham
Yes and No.Rumfitt, I.

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Negation on the Australian Plan.Berto, Francesco & Restall, Greg

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