John Searle's Theory of Intentionality: A Study of Philosophy of Mind نظرية جون سيرل في القصدية: دراسة في فلسفة العقل

kuwait: Annals of the Arts and Social Science, University of Kuwait, pp.1-200. (2007)
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Abstract
دراسة فى فلسفة العقل عند جون سيرل، مع التركيز على مفهوم القصدية John Searle is one of the most important and influential living philosophers of the last thirty years. The core concept of his philosophy is intentionality. Intentionality is the mind's capacity to direct itself at things or represent them. How does the mind work? How can the human mind represent the external world? Representation is the primary function of our minds. When we believe, think, plan, hope, desire, conceive, we are representing the world, and this makes our mental states intentional states. Do all mental states exhibit intentionality? Do only mental states exhibit intentionality? What is the structure of intentional states? What is the intentionality of perception and action? What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between the intentionality of mind and intentionality of language? In this monograph, I try to answer these questions and others, and I will reconstruct Searle’s theory of intentionality and evaluate it in the light of the history of intentionality, especially Brentano’s thesis, and recent developments in the philosophy of mind.
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