A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism

In João Luis Pereira Ourique (ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy. Pelotas, Brazil: pp. 77-78 (2018)
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Abstract
I defend belief-credence dualism, the view that we have both beliefs and credences and both attitudes are equally fundamental. First, I explain belief, credence, and three views on their relationship. Then, I argue for dualism. I do so first by painting a picture of the mind on which belief and credence are two cognitive tools that we use for different purposes. Finally, I respond to two objections to dualism. I conclude that dualism is a promising view, and one that both epistemologists and philosophers of mind should take seriously.
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Archival date: 2018-11-26
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