A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Episteme 18 (2):313–327 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.
Reprint years
2021
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JACADO-8
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-05-28
Latest version: 3 (2021-06-06)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-05-28

Total views
539 ( #10,919 of 2,445,957 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
112 ( #5,243 of 2,445,957 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.