A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Episteme:1-15 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.
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JACADO-8
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First archival date: 2019-05-28
Latest version: 2 (2019-07-11)
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2019-05-28

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