Belief, Credence, and Faith
Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168 (2019)
Abstract
In this article, I argue that faith’s going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.
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2018-04-25
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2018-04-25
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526 ( #9,549 of 57,106 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
95 ( #6,326 of 57,106 )
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