Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This paper introduces and motivates a solution to a dilemma from peer disagreement. Following Buchak (forthcoming), I argue that peer disagreement puts us in an epistemic dilemma: there is reason to think that our opinions should both change and not change when we encounter disagreement with our epistemic peers. I argue that we can solve this dilemma by changing our credences, but not our beliefs in response to disagreement. I explain how my view solves the dilemma in question, and then offer two additional arguments for it: one related to contents and attitudes, and another related to epistemic peerhood.
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Archival date: 2020-07-28
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