Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper introduces and motivates a solution to a dilemma from peer disagreement. Following Buchak (2021), I argue that peer disagreement puts us in an epistemic dilemma: there is reason to think that our opinions should both change and not change when we encounter disagreement with our epistemic peers. I argue that we can solve this dilemma by changing our credences, but not our beliefs in response to disagreement. I explain how my view solves the dilemma in question, and then offer two additional arguments for it: one related to contents and attitudes, and another related to epistemic peerhood.

Author's Profile

Elizabeth Jackson
Toronto Metropolitan University


Added to PP

619 (#26,883)

6 months
141 (#26,155)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?