Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper introduces and motivates a solution to a dilemma from peer disagreement. Following Buchak (2021), I argue that peer disagreement puts us in an epistemic dilemma: there is reason to think that our opinions should both change and not change when we encounter disagreement with our epistemic peers. I argue that we can solve this dilemma by changing our credences, but not our beliefs in response to disagreement. I explain how my view solves the dilemma in question, and then offer two additional arguments for it: one related to contents and attitudes, and another related to epistemic peerhood.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-07-28
Latest version: 3 (2021-07-31)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
240 ( #28,098 of 65,663 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #13,696 of 65,663 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.