Epistemic Akrasia and Belief-Credence Dualism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, arguing that they support belief-credence dualism. Belief-credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p. We argue that dualists, as opposed to belief-firsters (who say credence reduces to belief) and credence-firsters (who say belief reduces to credence) can best explain features of akratic cases, including the observation that akratic beliefs seem to be held despite possessing a defeater for those beliefs, and that, in akratic cases, one can simultaneously believe and have low confidence in the very same proposition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JACEAA-5
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-06-08
Latest version: 2 (2021-06-08)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-06-08

Total views
65 ( #48,511 of 2,432,206 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #10,923 of 2,432,206 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.