Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology

In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 201-215 (2020)
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Abstract
Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
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First archival date: 2019-11-09
Latest version: 2 (2020-03-03)
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