Prudential Arguments, Naturalized Epistemology, and the Will to Believe

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This paper argues that treating James' "The Will to Believe" as a defense of prudential reasoning about belief seriously misrepresents it. Rather than being a precursor to current defenses of prudential arguments, James paper has, if anything, more affinities to certain prominent strains in contemporary naturalized epistemology.
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Archival date: 2018-06-26
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