Settling the Unsettled: Roles for Belief

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Abstract
In Unsettled Thoughts, Julia Staffel argues that non-ideal thinkers should seek to approximate ideal Bayesian rationality. She argues that the more rational you are, the more benefits of rationality you will enjoy. After summarizing Staffel’s main results, this paper looks more closely at two issues that arise later in the book: the relationship between Bayesian rationality and other kinds of rationality, and the role that outright belief plays in addition to credence. Ultimately, I argue that there are several roles that outright belief might play, and I explore different ways that these roles for belief might fit together.
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First archival date: 2021-04-01
Latest version: 3 (2021-04-07)
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2021-04-01

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