Why Credences Are Not Beliefs
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370 (2022)
Abstract
A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On the belief-first view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief, that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account for agents who have credences in propositions they barely comprehend. I conclude that, however credences differ from beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1080/00048402.2020.1867210
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2020-11-27
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104 (#7,603)
2020-11-27
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648 (#12,532)
6 months
104 (#7,603)
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