Searle on the Intentional Content of Visual Experiences

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Abstract
I argue that, holding that the specification of Intentional content of the visual experience should be in the form of a proposition, John Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality and therefore bypasses the first-person important distinction between simple seeing and judgmental seeing. The specification of the content only in the form of the proposition does not allow making such a distinction on the level of description. Then I argue that the feature of the causal self-referentiality of the visual experience belongs to its psychological mode but not, as Searle holds, to the Intentional content of the visual experience
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JAFSOT-2
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Archival date: 2016-01-11
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Peacocke, Christopher & Searle, John R.
Logical Investigations.Husserl, Edmund & Findlay, J. N.
Perception.Mulligan, Kevin

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2016-01-11

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