Being Positive About Negative Facts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making and truth-making, and in constituting holes and edges.

Author Profiles

Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Stephen Barker
Nottingham University


Added to PP

5,637 (#646)

6 months
276 (#2,946)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?