Intrinsic colors - and what it is like to see them

In R. Mausfeld & D. Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford, Egyesült Királyság: Oxford University Press. pp. 303-306 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This is a commentary on Laurence Maloney’s chapter in Mausfeld R., and Heyer, D. (Eds.): Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. I discuss two related proposals as to the nature of object color formulated by Maloney. On the first proposal colors are photoreceptor excitations; on the second, they are fundamental, universal reflectance characteristics of terrestrial surfaces. I argue that the second proposal is suitable for purposes of color objectivism, whereas the first one is not. However, if we look at Maloney’s – and Brian Wandell’s – models of color vision and color constancy more thoroughly, not even the second version supports absolutist versions of color objectivism, according to which observer-independent reflectance properties determine, or are identical to, the phenomenal character of color experience.

Author's Profile

Zoltan Jakab
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences


Added to PP

85 (#73,754)

6 months
44 (#47,541)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?